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Abstract This paper provides an overview of the development of the constitutional
value of human dignity under German constitutional law. First, it provides a back-
ground to the German constitutional order then it places the constitutional value of
dignity within the framework of the constitutional court’s jurisprudence on personality
rights. It then progresses to an examination of specific cases that have developed
personality rights and the importance of the constitutional court’s interpretation of
personality and dignity in the personal and outer spheres within the framework of the
German legal order. The article concludes with some observations and comparisons
between German and American law in this area.
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Introduction
The quest for human dignity in modern society is a noble but elusive goal. Difficult
to define,1 difficult to realize, personally or socially, dignity nevertheless remains a
defining trait of human character, and a preeminent ideal of western society.
All rights reserved. Excepts of this article are taken from my article on Human Dignity, Privacy, and
Personality in German and American Constitutional Law, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 963.
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1 In western thought, the most definitive elaboration of the concept of human dignity is in the work of
Immanuel Kant (1959). Recently, there has been a renaissance in the influence of Kantian thought, as a
counterweight to utilitarianism. This is most pronounced in the work of Rawls (1971, 1993). There are
other conceptions of dignity too. Dworkin (1977, 1986), Nozick (1974).
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From the perspective of an individual, dignity might be thought of as the ability
to pursue one’s rights, claims or interests in daily life so that one can attain full
realization of one’s talents, ambitions or abilities, as one would like. That is one
path to satisfaction, social recognition and stature, certainly attributes of dignity.
This might be thought of as self-realization, although that is not the only conception
of dignity. What matters here is that each person should be free to develop his own
personality to the fullest subject only to restrictions arising from others’ pursuit of
the same.2
Of course, there must be some limit to individual freedom if society is to function in
a reasonably orderly manner. Thus, from the standpoint of society, individual
aspiration must be measured against the demand for order, peace and social harmony.
This balance between the aspiration of individual freedom and the demands of
organized society has been a central quest of modern constitutional law.3
Today this balance is harder than ever to achieve. Social demands have escalated,
placing elevated pressures on the integrity of human personhood. The rise of the
administrative state, for example, has led to omnipresent government and its potential
to suffocate personal freedom.4 Technology now develops so rapidly and pervasively
that it risks overwhelming individuality. For example, computers can gather, store and
transmit information so capably that they can access and, even, mimic human
functions.5 Gene technology, artificial insemination and the ability to prolong and,
indeed, end life pose troubling existential questions. How are we coping in this world,
in isolation or in comparison to others?
This article takes up these themes by exploring the concept of human dignity, as
reflected in the German legal order. Germany is a good choice for this evacuation
because of its European intellectual and cultural influences; a highly developed,
advanced industrial society, coping with change and technological revolution; and
strives to meet the aspiration of individual freedom within a stable social construct.
Human dignity is, of course, an elusive concept to define. For our purposes, we will
concentrate on the content given the term by the German constitutional law. In
particular, we will explore how persons are free to develop their own personalities.
A person might choose, for example, to be let alone as master of his/her realm. Or, one
might engage vigorously in the affairs of the day. In Germany, these matters are
covered in the right to the free unfolding of personality. It makes sense to focus on the
constitutional law of a country because recording in a constitution a culture’s highest
values is a defining attribute of western society. Certainly this is the case with
Germany. The Basic Law, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, guides and
organizes society. By exploring this concept of human dignity in the constitutional
order, insight can be derived as to the quality of the human condition, the reach of
individual freedom, and the make up of the social order. The particular traits,
2 This is fundamentally a Kantian thought that each moral agent should develop their talents to the
maximum extent compatible with the freedom of others. For Kant, the concepts of freedom, development
of moral personality, reverence of the moral law and treating people as the final end are interlinked.
3 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961).
4 Eberle (1999).
5 See, e.g., Schwartz (1989).
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activities or essences sought to be realized by each country reveals something
important about human personality as it relates to society. Likewise, the limitations
on freedom articulated are instructive of the social structure sought to be created. In
short, the balance struck between individual freedom and the social order illuminates
the legal culture.
To accomplish these goals, some grounding in German constitutional law is first
necessary, particularly its protection of human dignity and personality. This is the
subject of the first part. The second part provides an overview of human dignity as
developed in German personality rights. The third part details freedom of action, is
outward in focus, including protection of activities like freedom to travel. German
law also guarantees a personal sphere that is inward in orientation which is the
subject of the fourth part. This entails a number of strands, such as informational
self-determination. The final part makes some observations on Germany’s view of
human dignity and the strength of its constitutional vision.
The German Constitutional Order and Its Protection of Human Dignity
and Personality
The German Constitutional Order
The adoption of the Basic Law in 1949, following the debacle of World War II,
signaled a new constitutional order in Germany. Seeking distance from the horrors of
Nazism, the Basic Law makes a sharp break from this immediate past, instead
drawing deeply upon German tradition to found the legal order on moral and rational
idealism, particularly that of Kant.6 Thus, the Basic Law is a value-oriented
constitution that obligates the state to realize a set of objectively ordered principles,
rooted in justice and equality that are designed to restore the centrality of humanity to
the social order, and thereby secure a stable democratic society on this basis. These
values are not to be sacrificed for the exigencies of the day, as had been the case
during the Nazi time.7 The Rechtsstaat principle, for example, obligates society to
adhere to a rule of law, requiring that legal measures have a legal basis and discernible
content, provide fair notice and be necessary and proportional to the ends they seek to
accomplish (proportionality Principle). The principle of the Social State (Sozialstaat-
sprinzip) obligates the state to take necessary social-welfare measures so that all
citizens will have a dignified existence.8 The concept of a ‘‘militant democracy’’
(streitbare Demokratie) obligates the state to resist any threats to the basic democratic
order, thereby assuring the flourishing of democracy.9
Crucial also to the German social order is commitment to human rights. Many
fundamental values are enumerated in a catalogue of basic rights, including
6 von Muench (1981) [hereinafter ‘‘Muench Commentary]; Kommers (1989); Badura (1964).
7 Fletcher (1984).
8 See Basic Law article 20(1). For elaboration of the concept of the Social State, See Kommers (1989).
For the intellectual origins of the Social State.
9 See, e.g., Klass Case, 30 BVerfGE 1, 19–20 (1970).
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protections of free conscience, faith and creed, free expression, equality and
occupational freedom. The Basic Law is far more specific and comprehensive in its
listing of basic freedoms, enumerating at least twenty specific individual liberties, as
compared to the relatively sparse enumeration of liberties in the American
Constitution.10
There are differences in the countries’ conception of basic rights. Fundamental to
the German constitutional scheme is the principle of objective and subjective rights,
or positive and negative liberties. The objective dimension of rights obligates the
government to create the proper conditions so that rights might be realized.11 This
bestows duties on the state, calling for state activism along these lines. For example,
the concept of human dignity protected in Article one obligates the state to provide a
basic minimal existence for citizens.12 This objective dimension to basic rights is
tied to the value-ordered nature of the German constitutional scheme, obligating the
government to realize in society the set of objective values embodied in the Basic
Law. ‘‘This value-system, which centers upon human dignity and the free unfolding
of the human personality within the social community, must be looked upon as a
fundamental constitutional decision affecting all areas of law, public and private.’’13
By interpreting basic rights as establishing an ‘‘objective’’ ordering of values,
centered around human dignity, the Constitutional Court transformed those values
into principles so important that they must exist ‘‘objectively’’–as an independent
force, separate from their specific manifestation in a concrete legal relationship. So
conceived, objective rights form part of the legal order–the ordre public, thereby
becoming part of the governing principles of German society.14 In this way, the
Basic Law acts as a blueprint for society, setting forth the values to be realized,
requiring a close fit between its text and society.
The second aspect of German basic rights is their subjective or negative
dimension. This means that rights play a defensive role, delimiting a sphere of
personal liberty beyond governmental control. In German law, this concept of rights
is referred to as ‘‘subjective,’’ denoting a set of rights exercisable by individuals.
The essential character of this subjective dimension corresponds to the American
conception of fundamental constitutional rights. In contrast to the American
constitution, the German Basic Law also sets forth certain duties incumbent upon
citizens or government to perform. For example, article 6(2) provides that ‘‘(T)he
care and upbringing of children shall be a natural right of and a duty primarily
incumbent on the parents. The state shall watch over their endeavors in this
respect.’’15 Moreover, the objective value order, as worked out by the Court,
10 These differences should be expected in charters drafted in 1949 and 1791 (Bill of Rights).
11 Quint (1989).
12 This provides the foundation for the social welfare principle, anchored in article 20(1), that
distinguishes Germany.
13 Lu¨th, 7 BVerfGE 198, 205 (1958).
14 Eberle (1999). They might even be viewed as ‘‘permanent ends of the state,’’ not ‘‘changeable’’ even
by constitutional amendment. Quint (1989), noting Art. 79(3) GG.).
15 In actuality, duties are only sparingly spelled out in the Basic Law, in contrast to the 1918 Weimar
Constitution, which elaborated a set of duties. See Eberle (1999). See Pieroth and Schlink (1994).
204 E. J. Eberle
123
calibrates the relationships between rights, and among rights and duties. Thus,
German citizens have both claims to subjective rights, which they may exercise, and
objective rights, which they can call on government to perform, and must,
additionally, assume duties as to how to act on such rights. We can thus see that the
contrast between the text and nature of the two constitutions is striking. The German
Basic Law is value-oriented and sets forth both rights and duties, whereas the
United States Constitution attempts to be value-neutral pursuant to a scheme of
negative liberties, specifically enumerating rights government may not infringe, but
not stating comparable duties citizens must assume or values government must
realize.
Constitutional interpretative techniques in Germany place a premium on the text
of the Basic Law and it applicability to social and economic conditions. Beyond
textual and structural exegesis, German interpreters would also employ historical
and teleological analysis, before integrating the whole through techniques of
harmonization (praktische Konkordanz) and integration.16 The Constitutional Court
employs a variety of reasoning techniques, including arguments based on text,
structure, history and natural law.17
In Germany, the Constitutional Court treats history as an auxiliary source of
interpretation. While the Court is free to consult Framers’ intent, such history
generally lends support to a result reached through other interpretative methods,
such as the textual, structural or teleological analysis noted above. Framers’ intent is
not an independent source of authority.18 Instead, the Court mainly interprets
constitutional text in relationship to the conditions of modern society. This is
perhaps most pronounced in relation to the article one concept of human dignity,
where the Court has stated: ‘‘any decision defining human dignity in concrete terms
must be based on our present understanding of it and not on any claim to a
conception of timeless validity.’’19
Human Dignity in Germany
Human dignity is the central value of the Basic Law. This determination reflects the
conscious intention to elevate modern Germany beyond the inhumanity of Nazism,
signaling a new constitutional order. Article 1(1) therefore states ‘‘The dignity of
man shall be inviolable.’’ The second paragraph of article one reinforces the
centrality of human rights to the concept of human dignity: ‘‘The German people
therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every
community, of peace and of justice in the world.’’20
16 See Brugger (1994). See also Kommers (1989).
17 Kommers (1989).
18 Brugger (1994), Kommers (1989). Note, for example, the Constitutional Court: ‘‘the original history of
a particular provision of the Basic Law has no decisive importance’’ in constitutional interpretation.
Homosexuality Case, 6 BVerfGE 389, 431 (1957), translated in Kommers (1989).
19 Life Imprisonment Case, 45 BVerfGE 187, 229 (1977), translated in Currie (1994).
20 Kommers (1989). For elaboration of the Kantian roots of the Basic Law, particularly in Articles one
and two, See Ewald (1995).
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A core aspect of human dignity is the guarantee of human rights. Indeed, the
specific enumeration of basic rights in the Basic Law are themselves tangible
manifestations of human dignity. This catalogue of basic rights is systematically
ordered, making up a central aspect of the objectively determined set of values that
govern German society. In this way, dignity and basic rights have a mutually
nourishing effect on one another.21 But human dignity means more than the specific
catalogue of basic rights. Dignity is not merely a focus on individuality. As the central
value of the constitution, it infuses throughout the whole constitutional order,
obligating the state both to protect and realize it. This includes a communitarian
dimension; by requiring respect for others’ claims to dignity, vindication for the
human dignity of all is better assured, and a community of mutual cooperation and
solidarity is fostered.
The concept of human dignity in the Basic Law reflects the influence of three
main schools of thought, although it was not intended to be strictly associated with
any one of them. The three influences are Christian natural law, Kantian moral
philosophy and more secular theories of personal autonomy and self-determina-
tion.22 In the dignitarian jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, however, the
Court has mainly followed Kant’s theory of moral autonomy. This is evident, for
example, in the leading Life Imprisonment Case, where the Court attempted to
capture the essence of human dignity:
It is contrary to human dignity to make the individual the mere tool (blosses
Objekt) of the state. The principle that ‘‘each person must always be an end in
himself’’ applies unreservedly to all areas of the law; the intrinsic dignity of
the person consists in acknowledging him as an independent personality.23
Still, human dignity is essentially an abstract, normative concept, albeit with a
philosophical framework, and the Framers sought, and the Court has striven, to keep
the term an open one, preferring that it take on concrete meaning through case-by-
case determination. Thus, the main definition of dignity is the meaning given it by
the Court in its jurisprudence.
Human Personhood and the Polity
The dignitarian jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court is replete with references
to the nature of humankind and society.24 The Court has frequently characterized
man as a ‘‘spiritual-moral being,’’ reflecting the Christian-natural law influence. The
Life Imprisonment Case is again a good statement of this:
21 Kommers (1989).
22 Under Christian natural law theories, dignity is a gift of God and, therefore, an inalienable aspect of
humanity. Under Kantian philosophy, dignity is an indispensable part of human nature. Under a more
secular theory of self-realization, the decisive aspect of human dignity is self-realization of one’s identity
through exercise of one’s talents and abilities. For elaboration of these theories, and their influence on
human dignity, See Pieroth and Schlink (1994).
23 45 BVerfGE 187, 228 (1977), translated in Currie (1994).
24 Kommers (1989) (‘‘The Constitutional Court’s ‘dignitarian’ jurisprudence contains numerous
declarations about the nature of the human person and the polity’’).
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The constitutional principles of the Basic Law embrace the respect and
protection of human dignity. The free human person and his dignity are the
highest values of the constitutional order. The state in all of its forms is
obliged to respect and defend it. This is based on the conception of man as a
spiritual-moral being endowed with the freedom to determine and develop
himself.25
A strongly Kantian view likewise invests the concept of personhood with rationality
and self-determination, but also with duties and moral bounds. These strands of
thought converge to form an integrated, whole person. As envisioned in German
law, human beings are spiritual-moral beings who are to act freely, but their actions
are to be bound by a sense of moral duty. Actions, in other words, are to be guided
by a sense of social need, personal responsibility and human solidarity.26
There is a strong linkage of the concept of personhood to the social community.
The seminal case on artistic freedom, Mephisto, captured this thought well: ‘‘the
human person (is) an autonomous being developing freely within the social
community.’’27 The human is not to be ‘‘an isolated and self-regarding individ-
ual,’’28 as she so often seems to be in the American social scheme. Rather, the
human is to be ‘‘related to and bound by the community.’’29 The Investment Aid
Case first advanced the concept of the human as a community-bound person:
The image of man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated, sovereign
individual; rather, the Basic Law has decided in favor of a relationship
between individual and community in the sense of a person’s dependence on
and commitment to the community, without infringing upon a person’s
individual value.30
Once again, these statements bear the clear imprint of Kantian moral philosophy.
Thus, the community envisioned by the Basic Law is one where individuality and
human dignity are to be guaranteed and nourished, but with a sense of social solidarity
and responsibility. Rather than a collection of atomistic individuals, people are
connected to one another. Thus, individual self-determination is offset by concepts of
‘‘participation, communication and civility.’’31 In short, at the root of the German
social vision is the Kantian proposition that humans are to be treated always as ends in
themselves, and never as means, and that this is to be done within a moral social
construct, that both empowers and guides people. The Life Imprisonment Case, again,
gives good voice to these thoughts:
25 45 BVerfGE 187, 227 (1977), translated in Kommers (1989).
26 Kommers (1989); Ewald (1995).
27 30 BVerfGE 173, 193 (1971), translated in Kommers (1989).
28 Life Imprisonment Case, 45 BVerfGE 187, 227 (1977), translated in Kommers (1989).
29 Ibid.
30 4 BVerfGE 7, 15–16 (1954), translated in Kommers (1989); Klass Case, 30 BVerfGE 1, 20 (1979);
Conscientious Objector Case I, 12 BVerfGE 45, 51 (1960).
31 Kommers (1989).
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This freedom within the meaning of the Basic Law is not that of an isolated and
self-regarding individual but rather (that) of a person related to and bound by the
community. In the light of this community-boundlessness it cannot be ‘‘in
principle unlimited.’’ The individual must allow those limits on his freedom of
action that the legislature deems necessary in the interest of the community’s
social life; yet the autonomy of the individual has to be protected. This means
that (the state) must regard every individual within society with equal worth. It is
contrary to human dignity to make persons the mere tools [blosses objekt] of the
state. The principle that ‘‘each person must shape his own life’’ applies
unreservedly to all areas of law;’’ the intrinsic dignity of each person depends on
his status as an independent personality.’’32 The German social vision unfolds
within a more shared sense of community.
The Concrete Meaning of Human Dignity
Since human dignity is a capacious concept, it is difficult to determine precisely
what it means outside the context of a factual setting. As the driving principle of the
legal order, however, and as a root of Kantian thought, it possesses a certain fixed
content. At a minimum, for example, it means that the social order must reflect
recognition of the equality of humankind. This concept is anchored in article three
of the Basic Law. Equality means at least that persons are entitled to ‘‘equal
worth’’33 and that, accordingly, there can be no slavery or serfdom, racial or ethnic
discrimination.34 Second, dignity means respect of physical identity and integrity,
which is textually specified in article 2(2). This prohibits torture and corporal
punishment and forbids imposing punishment without fault or levying dispropor-
tionate penalties.35 Third, dignity means respect of intellectual and spiritual identity
and integrity.36 This is manifested most dramatically in the protection of personality
rights, specified in article two and elaborated on in this article. Fourth, dignity
means limitation of official power. This is particularly evident in the guarantee of
proportionality, which circumscribes governmental means to legitimate ends and of
procedural due process rights, which allow persons affected by official action to be
heard and to be able to influence proceedings which concern them.37 Fifth, dignity
means guarantee of individual and social existence. Tangibly, this is manifested in
the article 2(2) right to life and in Germany’s social welfare state, textually anchored
in article 20(1).38
32 45 BVerfGE at 227–28, translated in Kommers (1989). For elaboration of this, See Maunz (1993)
[hereinafter ‘‘Maunz Commentary’’].
33 Life Imprisonment, 45 BVerfGE at 228.
34 Pieroth and Schlink (1994).
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. Note Article 19(4): ‘‘Should any person’s rights be violated by public authority, recourse to the
court shall be open to him.’’).
38 See Pieroth and Schlink (1994).
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The main development of dignitarian jurisprudence has occurred in conjunction
with the more concrete freedoms of article two. There are three specific freedoms in
article two. The first of these is the right to free development of personality, phrased
in article 2(1) as ‘‘Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his
personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the
constitutional order or against morality.’’39
The second of the important article two freedoms is ‘‘the right to life and to
physical integrity.’’40 The right to life clause is the source for the Constitutional
Court’s conclusion in the Abortion Cases41 that the state has a duty to protect life
after conception, which resulted in strict limitation of abortion. Apart from abortion,
the Constitutional Court has not invoked the clause to place wide-ranging duties to
protect life on the state. While recognizing a duty to protect life, the Court has
deferred to government’s implementation of it. Accordingly, the Court has rejected
the imposition of affirmative state duties in relation to the prevention of kidnapping
or rescuing of its victims42 or the guarding against threats to the environment from
army bases or nuclear plants.43
The ‘‘physical integrity’’ clause is mainly used as a source to guide criminal
procedures, somewhat like our criminal due process jurisprudence.44 It has also been
used to limit invasions of the body that would cause pain, harm, disfigurement or
injury. For example, in the Spinal Tap Case, the Court invalidated a court-ordered
sampling of a defendant’s spinal column to test his involvement in a crime on the
ground that this violated one’s physical integrity.45 The Court has also invalidated use
of polygraph tests to determine a defendant’s veracity.46 Attaching a person to a
machine to force the truth out, the Court reasoned, is ‘‘an inadmissible invasion of a
person’s innermost self and a violation of human dignity.’’ Man should not be ‘‘an
object of experimentation,’’ a manifestation of the Kantian injunction to treat people as
only ends.47 Efforts to apply the physical integrity clause outside the criminal context
have not, as yet, been successful. The topic of physical inviolability, being mainly a
criminal one, will not be addressed in this article.
39 The notion of free development of personality is fundamentally a Kantian one.
40 Art. 2(2) GG.
41 Abortion II, 88 BVerfGE 203 (1993); Abortion I, 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975).
42 Schleyer Kidnapping Case, 46 BVerfGE 160 (1977).
43 Chemical Weapons Case, 77 BVerfGE 170 (1987) (right to life clause does not prevent state from
approving storage of chemical weapons at army bases). In Mu¨lheim, 53 BVerfGE 30, 57–69 (1979) and
Kalkar, 49 BVerfGE 89, 140–44 (1978), the Constitutional Court recognized a state duty to protect life in
connection with the threats of a nuclear power plant, but determined that the duty could be met in the
manner the government determined.
44 Article 2(2) GG. Kommers (1989).
45 16 BVerfGE 194 (1963). See also Pneumoencephalography Case, 17 BVerfGE 108 (1963) (Court
invalidated court-ordered puncture of a person’s vertebral canal for purposes of testing personality for
crime).
46 Polygraph Case, 35 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) (375 (1982) (Decision of August 18,
1981). See also 17 BVerfGE 347 (1963).
47 Kommers (1989).
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The last of the article two freedoms provides that ‘‘The liberty of the individual
shall be inviolable.’’ This mainly operates in conjunction with the other article 2(2)
freedoms. It too will not be extensively considered here.48
Not surprisingly, human dignity, alone or in conjunction with the more particular
freedoms of article two, is a rich source of constitutional litigation, and is widely
debated on and off the court.49 Human dignity in Germany is thus most like the
American concept of modern substantive due process, particularly rights of privacy.
Both concepts are open-ended and controversial, posing difficult questions for the
role of the court within a democracy and the nature of the constitutional order. The
remaining part of this article explores this topic as it relates to the development of
human personality in Germany.
Aspects of German Personality Rights
The German Law on the ‘‘free unfolding of personality’’ is comprehensive and
multi-faceted. Grounded in human dignity and Kantian philosophy, the right is the
only one read in conjunction with another right.50 In contrast to human dignity,
personality is not an objective value and therefore does not generally operate to
impose affirmative obligations on the state.
Personality rights come into play, potentially, whenever an action is not protected
by a more specific right. Theoretically, all claims or interests have the potential to be
so protected. In this way, article one human dignity and article two (1) rights
interact to form comprehensive protection of human personality and personhood.
The Constitutional Court captured the sense of these rights well in the Eppler Case:
They complement as ‘‘undefined’’ freedom the special (defined) freedoms, like
freedom of conscience or expression, equally constitutive elements of person-
ality. Their function is, in the sense of the ultimate constitutional value, human
dignity, to preserve the narrow personal life sphere and to maintain its conditions
that are not encompassed by traditional concrete guarantees.51
This ‘‘catch-all’’ function of personality rights is especially important in view of
‘‘modern developments and the associated threats they pose to the protection of
human personality.’’52
Textually, comprehensive rights are not clearly derivable from enumeration of a
‘‘right to the free development of personality’’. Still, the fundamental thrust of the
German Constitutional Court has been to enlarge the rights sought to be captured by
the language, as compared to confining itself to strict application of the language of
48 Mainly, this freedom protects free physical movement. It is somewhat akin to the English concept of
habeas corpus, protecting against arbitrary restraints on physical liberty. See Pieroth and Schlink (1994).
49 See, e.g., Badura (1964) (examination of roots of dignity concept); Degenhart (1992) (examination of
general right of personality); Hofmann (1993) (exploration of capacious concept of human dignity).
50 Conversation with Professor Dr. Bodo Pieroth, Universita¨t Mu¨nster, Mu¨nster, Germany (July 8, 1996).
51 54 BVerfGE 148, 153 (1980).
52 Right to Heritage I, 79 BVerfGE 256, 268 (1988).
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the text.53 German personality law is thus a creature of the Constitutional Court, as
rights of privacy are of the Supreme Court.
There are two components to German personality law: freedom of action and
guarantee of a personal sphere. Freedom of action is outward in focus. As conceived
in the seminal Elfes Case, freedom of action empowers one to do fundamentally
what one desires insofar as it does not interfere with others or the constraints of the
social order.54 Essentially, this aspect of personality allows one to define oneself in
relation to society.
As freedom of action is outward in focus, the personal sphere is inward in
orientation. In comparison to freedom of action, the personal sphere delimits an
essential sphere of privacy within which one can fundamentally determine who one
is and how one should relate to the world, if at all. One may choose to engage
actively in the world, and thus avail oneself of freedoms of action. Or, one may
choose to withdraw from the world, retreating into oneself and concentrating on
inner development. The Constitutional Court has actively sought to create an inner,
intimate sphere so that a core of personality might be developed and protected. The
focus on interiority reflects the underlying vision of man as a ‘‘spiritual-moral’’
being.55
The personal sphere is narrower in dimension than the range of freedom of action.
It protects only against incursions that aim to curtail the personal sphere. Just what
this means is better elaborated by case law than definition, and the Court has had some
difficulty in fixing the concept.56 Confidentiality is protected, such as the secret taping
of conversations57 or the attempted use of divorce records in a work disciplinary
proceeding,58 as is inquiry into personal matters, as developed in the Census Cases.59
The Court, in fact, has sought to delineate a range of tangible rights that map out this
private sphere in order to lend structure to personality rights. The German focus on
the inner life may reflect the fact that freedom in public life was foreclosed for much
of modern history, leaving the inner realm as the stage for freedom. Certainly a
German interior life has deep intellectual and cultural roots. Cultural and artistic
manifestations of the human spirit have traditionally been prized in Germany. For
now, however, these thoughts must await further development. First, we must
consider the jurisprudence of the Court so that we will have an empirical basis on
which to base such observation. The next part of the article explores the twin inner
and outer dimension of German law, starting with the outer dimension as crystallized
around the concept of freedom of action.
53 Degenhart (1992).
54 6 BVerfGE 32 (1957). For elaboration of the concept of free development of personality, See Pieroth
and Schlink (1994); Degenhart (1992).
55 See, e.g., Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 36 (essence of man as spiritual-moral person).
56 Criminal Diary Case, 80 BVerfGE 367, 373–75 (1980).
57 Tape Recording Case, 34 BVerfGE 238 (1973).
58 Divorce Records, II, 32 BVerfGE 373 (1972); Divorce I, 27 BVerfGE 344 (1970).
59 Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1 (1984); Microcensus, 27 BVerfGE 1 (1969).
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Freedom of Action: The Outer World: Elfes and the General Right
of Personality
German personality law began with the ground-breaking decision of Elfes in 1957.60
The setting seemed an odd one in which to announce a general personality right.
Elfes was active in right-wing politics, before and after World War II, enjoying
some success, including election as a parliamentary representative as a member of
the Christian Democratic Union.61 In his political activities, he was a severe critic of
West German defense policy and its policy toward reunification, having participated
in conferences and demonstrations at home and abroad.62 Seeking to continue
spreading his message abroad, he sought extension of his visa to attend a foreign
political conference, but was denied on the ground that his criticism constituted a
threat to national security.
Elfes first argued that his activities were protected by article 11, which guarantees
Germans freedom of movement. However, the Court ruled that this provision
applied only to inter-German travel, not foreign travel.63 Thus, if Elfes was to
succeed, another argument was necessary. Even if foreign travel was not covered by
article 11, it might yet be part of one’s personal freedom of action, protected under
article two (l), so the Court determined. This illustrates the catch-all function of
article two personality rights: they capture claims not protected by the more specific
guarantees in the catalogue of basic rights.64
By freedom of action, the Court meant the right to engage in activities necessary
to the development and assertion of one’s person.65 Whether traveling abroad
constituted freedom of action depended on resolving a theoretical dispute, left open
in the Investment Aid Case,66 as to the reach of this freedom. In the Investment Aid
Case, the Court had laid out two definitions of freedom of action, not choosing one
over the other. Freedom of action could mean only a ‘‘minimal amount of this
freedom of action without which an individual would not be able to develop herself
60 6 BVerfGE 32 (1957). An earlier Constitutional Court case, the Investment Aid Case, 4 BVerfGE 7
(1954), had first begun the process of attempting to fix the definition of freedom of action. But the
essential development of a right of personality occurred in connection with the Federal Supreme Court’s
(BGH), the supreme interpreter of the German Civil Code (BGB), interpretation of the German Civil
Code. For example, the Schacht Case, 13 Entscheidungung des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen
(BGHZ) 334, NJW 1404 (1954). Elfes represented the Constitutional Court’s approval of these
developments of the BGH, thereby constitutionalizing the doctrine of a general right to personality.
61 He had been a member of the central committee of the party before 1933, police commissioner of
Krefeld in 1927 and mayor of Mo¨nchen-Gladbach, among other political activities: 6 BVerfGE at 32–33.
62 Ibid.
63 There was a long history of limitation of the right to travel abroad for security reasons, which the Court
noted. Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 6 BVerfGE at 36 (‘‘Seen from a legal perspective, [article 2(1)] is an independent basic right, that
guarantees general human freedom of action.’’).
66 4 BVerfGE 7 (1954).
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as a spiritual-moral person.’’67 Or, freedom of action could be interpreted ‘‘in a
broad, comprehensive sense.’’68
In Elfes, the Court decided that a broad interpretation better suited the text and
purpose of the Basic Law. First, it seemed inconceivable how a definition limited to
the ‘‘core area of personality’’ could ever result in violations of ‘‘the rights of others…
the constitutional order… or morality,’’ the textual limitations of personality.
It seemed hard to envision how these textual restrictions could then have meaning.
A broader interpretation thus seemed more sensible. Second, article two reflects
radiation of human dignity, the ultimate constitutional value, as do all constitutional
principles.69 Thus, a broad interpretation seemed more compatible with a view of
persons as morally autonomous beings operating responsibly within the community.
Third, an expansive interpretation also seemed more consistent with the Framers, who
had originally used the language ‘‘everyone can do or not do what he or she likes,’’
changing this for ‘‘linguistic’’ reasons, not legal considerations.70
A broad interpretation of freedom of action has important consequences for the
German constitutional order. As intended by the Court, every form of activity
related to personality, in principle, is covered by the concept. Restraints on personal
freedom will come only from those imposed as a condition of the ‘‘constitutional
order’’ or other textual limitations.71 This view thus endows persons with significant
personal freedom, transforming the Basic Law into a very rights-protective charter.
One might argue it is consistent with the concept of human dignity that infuses the
Basic Law, calling on the state, as it does, ‘‘to respect and protect it.’’72 In practice,
however, the Court has limited the reach of this freedom to mainly economic and
recreational areas despite the expansive reach of the concept.73 Yet, the role of
article two as the last preserve of individual freedom is an important principle.
Applying these principles, the Court determined that foreign travel was within
freedom of action.74 This determination did not, of course, end the inquiry. Freedom
of action is guaranteed only to the extent it is within the constitutional order, and
does not violate third party rights or morality.75 This thus provided the Court with
the occasion to interpret these textual limitations. At issue in Elfes was the
constitutional order limitation, since security measures are taken to protect society.
This is the most important limitation.
67 6 BVerfGE at 36. This is the so-called Core Theory (Kernbereich Theorie), by which is meant
protection of only a core of personality that involves the essence of woman as a spiritual-moral person.
68 Ibid.
69 ‘‘Certainly the … formulation of article 2(1) was an emanation of Seeing it in the light of Article one
and to derive therefrom its purpose to embody the vision of humankind.’’ Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 ‘‘Restraints on the free development of personality come from the constitutional order.’’ 6 BVerfGE at
37.
72 Article 1(1) GG.
73 Kommers (1989). The Falconry Licensing Case, 55 BVerfGE 159 (1980). Accord, Rider In Woods, 80
BVerfGE 164 (1980).
74 6 BVerfGE at 41–42.
75 This is the text of Article two, and as interpreted by the Court. 6 BVerfGE at 36–37.
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Rights of others entails the rights and claims of third parties.76 Such claims might
justifiably limit individual rights in Germany. In German law, this restriction has
been employed to ban arson and trespass, for example.77 In the context of religious
rights, the dignitarian rights of others were used to limit an atheist’s attempt to
coerce individuals to his view through use of cigarettes as bribery.78 However, third
party rights are ordinarily evidenced in the legal and constitutional order and, thus,
unlikely to act as an independent restraint.79
Morality is not self-defining in German law, although German law relies on
explicitly Christian law. Still, morality is mainly reflected in legal concepts, like
‘‘good morals’’ (guten Sitten) or ‘‘good faith’’ (Treu und Glauben),80 that make up
the legal order. As such, and especially with its roots in Kantian thought, morality
becomes an important background principle for the legal system as a whole. As a
practical matter, however, morality itself will not ordinarily restrain freedom of
action.81 This brings us back to the ‘‘constitutional order,’’ of which much depended
on its construction.
According to the Court, the constitutional order means the general legal order as
it conforms to the constitution.82 One interpretation of this would be that any law
consistent with the constitution, at least procedurally, could limit the basic right.
While textually plausible, this would effectively render the right meaningless.83
Since the Federal Republic was founded as a social-democratic state committed to
human dignity, this interpretation seemed inappropriate.
Rather, since the ‘‘Basic Law erected a value-oriented order… the independence,
self-determination, responsibility and dignity of individuals must be guaranteed in a
political community.’’84 Thus, for laws to be consistent with the constitution, they
must conform to the value-order of the Basic Law. At the top of this value-order is,
of course, human dignity, the ultimate constitutional value. In this context, dignity
means, at a minimum, that the ‘‘intellectual, political and economic freedom of
people may not be limited so that the essence of personhood is impaired.’’85 From
this it follows ‘‘that each citizen is afforded a sphere of private development … an
ultimate inviolable realm of personal freedom, insulated against encroachment by
public authorities.’’86 Certainly no law impinging on the ‘‘inviolable realm’’ could
be consistent with the Basic Law.
76 Pieroth and Schlink (1994).
77 Currie (1994).
78 Tobacco Atheist Case, 12 BVerfGE 1 (1960).
79 Pieroth and Schlink (1994).
80 Articles 138(1), 242, 826 German Civil Code (BGB).
81 Pieroth and Schlink (1994).
82 6 BVerfGE at 37–38.
83 Ibid. This interpretation was the one in vogue under the 1919 Weimar Constitution. But it Seemed
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Laws must also conform substantively to ‘‘unwritten fundamental constitutional
principles (of the free-democratic order), as well as the fundamental decisions of the
Basic Law, especially the principles of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) and the social
welfare principle.’’ (Sozialstaatsprinzip.)87 Through this interpretive technique, the
Court introduced significant background and, even, immanent, if not extra-textual,
authority. Again, this underscores the Court’s proactive interpretive stance and,
also, the rich context within which the Basic Law is to be interpreted. The
Rechtsstaat principle is especially significant in this regard. Under this principle,
laws must give fair warning and fair procedure, not be retroactive, and have a legal
basis.88 Most importantly, the concept of Rechtsstaat embodies the Proportionality
Principle, meaning, in essence, that laws must pursue proper ends through means
that are suitable and ‘‘proportional’’ to the ends sought. The Proportionality
Principle is akin to means/end testing in American rights analysis, such as that used
in heightened scrutiny methodologies.89 Both methodologies guard against arbitrary
government. Thus, the true impact of the Proportionality Principle is seen in case
law, as in America, where it often settles the case, as will be amply seen.
It is thus apparent that the value-oriented nature of the Basic Law influences
significantly the nature of the legal order. Laws must conform to this value-order to
be part of the ‘‘constitutional order.’’ ‘‘Constitutional order’’ is thereby rendered into
a two-sided limitation. While the ‘‘constitutional order’’ can limit personality rights,
this can occur only when laws themselves conform to the German value-order. In
essence, the Court implied a limitation from the structure of the Basic Law on the
express textual limitation of article 2(1), itself a notable, but plausible, act of
judicial activism.90 Significantly, this had the effect of transforming plain
constitutional language into an open-ended, general clause. Much will always
depend on judicial interpretation of article 2(1).
In Elfes, the Court found that Elfes’ interests in foreign travel was part of his
freedom of action, but that it was outweighed by the state security interests at
issue.91 Certainly state security is a justifiable part of the ‘‘constitutional order,’’
which might be used in limitation of basic rights. However, the particular state
interests at issue in Elfes did not seem particularly well drawn or persuasive. Elfes
was an elected official in Germany. His views were well-known, at home and
abroad. Thus, it seems unreasonable to find that another foreign trip would place the
state in jeopardy. Perhaps the government desired to protect its image abroad.
Perhaps it yet feared for the fragility of the new German experiment in democracy.
Certainly Elfes seems to reflect the skittishness of the cold-war times.
87 Ibid.
88 Currie (1994). See also Article 19(1) GG, (‘‘statutes [restricting rights] shall apply generally and not
solely to an individual case… (and) name the basic right.’’). The concept of Rechtsstaat can also be said
to embody the concept of meaningful judicial review of official action. Currie, supra note 7, at 19.
89 Under conventional American doctrine, violations of individual rights trigger strict scrutiny, an inquiry
requiring government to justify its regulation as ‘‘necessary to serve a compelling state interest and …
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’’ Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987).
90 6 BVerfGE at 37–41.
91 6 BVerfGE at 42–43.
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As a seminal case, it is notable that the Court in Elfes did not attempt to set out
any comprehensive definition of freedom of action. In fact, there is no case where
the Court has defined the full range of personality rights.92 Instead, the Court has
preferred to work out the specifics of what freedom of action means in concrete
cases in view of current or developing social conditions.93 Thus, the exact reach of
the zone in which individuals may shape their lives awaits case-by-case
developments, as in American autonomy law.
However, Elfes did establish the methodology applied by the Court to judge the
reasonableness of governmental action seeking to limit personal interests. As
applied in Elfes, this methodology is an ad hoc balancing test designed to test the
weight of the personal interest against the strength of the official interest. The Court
did not engage in any comprehensive review of the lower court decision, preferring
to look lightly at the court’s results. The Court looked only to see whether the lower
court decision had a basis in law.94 Certainly the Court was concerned that it not
intrude too deeply into the domain of the ordinary courts. It would take later events
before the Court would exercise a more intensive review of lower court cases to
further fundamental rights.
Elfes is significant in another regard. The techniques employed by the Court
illustrate how it has been able to assume its role as guardian of the constitution and,
correspondingly, censor of governmental action. The German Constitutional Court
thus parallels the role of the Supreme Court over matters that we call substantive
due process. In the modern era of human rights, the Supreme Court has judged the
reasonableness of official action against the opaque language of ‘‘due process of
law.’’ Both the German and American Courts have set up legal regimes to anchor
such operative terms in more solid ground. In Germany, we have seen how
personality rights have become part of a general ‘‘freedom of action’’ limited only
by third party rights, morality or the constitutional order. In the United States, the
due process inquiry involves a quest for those ‘‘basic values implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,’’95 which itself involves a reasoned judgment ‘‘of respect for the
liberty of the individual … (against) the demands of organized society.’’96 In both
countries, these decisions are ultimately acts of judicial judgment.
In Elfes, for example, national security interests were held to justify limitations
on foreign travel. Likewise, general freedom of actions have been limited by price
regulations97 and the freedom of action of a horse rider has been limited to assigned
bridal paths out of deference to the rights of hikers and bikers to pursue their
activities secure from horse traffic.98
92 Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1, 41 (1984); Kommers (1989).
93 Ibid.; Pieroth and Schlink (1994).
94 6 BVerfGE at 43–44 (court not to apply full-range review, but only look to See whether specific
constitutional provisions violated).
95 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan J., concurring) citing Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
96 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
97 8 BVerfGE 274, 327–29 (1958).
98 Rider in Woods, 80 BVerfGE 137 (1989).
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However, the Court has also invalidated measures for violating the Proportion-
ality Principle. Thus, government cannot prevent persons from trying to arrange
drivers for interested riders.99 Likewise, parents do not have unlimited power to
bind their minor children by contract.100 One of the best examples of the
Constitutional Court’s technique in judging state actions is the Falconry Licensing
Case,101 where the Court found governmental regulation unreasonable in requiring
those engaging in the sport of falconry to demonstrate competence in the use of
firearms.
Inner Freedom in German Law: The Personal Sphere
The flip side of freedom of action is a focus on the interior person. Here the
Constitutional Court has posited a ‘‘private sphere or ultimate domain of inviolability
in which a person is free to shape his life as he or she sees fit.’’102 This domain
includes the right to retreat from the world, as one likes, captured as the moral-
spiritual essence of being, as well as the right to engage actively in the world, as
covered by freedom of action. There is not, of course, a clear conceptual line between
the inner and outer world. Rather, both are components of an integrated, whole
person. Nevertheless, it is notable that German law has accented the interior
component of human personality, a focus American law has not, as yet, developed.
Establishment of Interiority in German Law: Microcensus Case
Focus on the interior component of human personality in German law began
comprehensively with the important Microcensus Case,103 which concerned the
constitutionality of a federal questionnaire or ‘‘microcensus’’ designed to elicit a
portrait of the German population. The questionnaire sought information over
personal habits, including vacation practices, occupation, standard of living and
whether mothers worked or remained home to rear children, among other topics.104
In this context, the Court carved out a private, personal sphere for citizens to inhabit
free from incursion.
The fact that the statistical survey sought personal information necessitated
inquiry into the domain of personal rights protected within article two. Here the
Constitutional Court raised the barricade of human dignity, which ‘‘the state could
take no measure, or enact any law, which would violate … or otherwise infringe
upon the essence of personal freedom as encompassed within the limits of article
99 17 BVerfGE 306, 313–18 (1964), noted in Currie (1994). Here Professor Currie catalogues a number
of cases along these lines.
100 72 BVerfGE 155, 170–73 (1986).
101 55 BVerfGE 159 (1980).
102 Kommers (1989).
103 27 BVerfGE 1 (1969).
104 Ibid.
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two.’’105 As should now be evident, there can be no greater thunder in the German
constellation than invocation of human dignity. The significance of this became
immediately clear: ‘‘The Basic Law thereby guarantees individual citizens an
inviolable area of personal freedom in which one can freely form one’s life, the
effect of which is to remove all official power (from this realm).’’106 This is the
personal sphere in which one is free to determine and structure one’s life.107
This intimate sphere is a critical part of the human vision that lies at the root of
the Basic Law, bestowing self-worth, social value and respect.108 This also shows
how concepts of human dignity, humanity and community are interlinked in
German law. Through this interaction, dignity takes on a more concrete meaning:
‘‘It would be inconsistent with human dignity for the state to force people to register
and catalogue their whole personalities, even if done anonymously through a
statistical survey, and thereby treating man as an object, which is accessible in every
manner.’’109 Insistence on respect for human dignity is thus instrumental to
preservation of human autonomy.
With this background, the Court went on to elaborate the Inner Sphere.
Such a (pervasive) penetration in the personal area through a comprehensive
inspection of the personal relationships of a citizen is also denied the state
because individuals must have an Inner Space (Innenraum) in which to
develop freely and self-responsibly their personalities, an Inner Space in
which they themselves possess and in which they can retreat, banning all
entrance to the outer world, in which one can enjoy tranquility and a right to
solitude.110
The presence of an ascertainable Inner Space in German personality law is a
notable achievement. It is wholly a creation of the Constitutional Court, in pursuit of
its perception of the vision underlying the Basic Law. Textually, it is certainly not
self-evident that ‘‘the dignity of man’’ or ‘‘the right to the free development of his
personality’’ would yield this emphasis. Rather, it reflects the Court’s desire to
preserve and protect the integrity of human personality, especially in applying the
concept of human dignity to meet changing social conditions, such as the
development and use of computer technology in Microcensus. In this way, human
autonomy and capacity are safeguarded and nourished against the challenges posed
by modern social, economic and technological change. Considering that law is a
reflection of culture, it is interesting to decipher the cultural traits evidenced by this
German accent on the interior life. For one thing, this focus is quite compatible with
German history and culture, which has placed extraordinary emphasis on the world
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 For this proposition, the Court, significantly, cited Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 41.
108 ’’In the light of this image of man at root in the Basic Law, the human achieves social value and
respect in society.’’ 27 BVerfGE at 6.
109 Ibid. These sentiments evidence, unmistakably, the influence of Kant.
110 27 BVerfGE at 6. The Court observed that even the presence of a neutrally devised state inspection
scheme could violate the right to personality because it would induce psychological pressure. Ibid.
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of the mind and of the artist. Emphasis of culture has predominated over public life
through most of German history. The German emphasis on interiority also reflects,
again, Kantian thought, and its emphasis on the autonomy of the individual and the
unfolding of human capacity.
As a matter of doctrinal law, the Constitutional Court’s carving out of a private,
intimate sphere has produced distinct strands of personality law. Perhaps most
notable is the general control over personal information that has resulted in a right to
informational self-determination. Related to informational self-determination is the
right to control over portrayal of one’s person, including rights to one’s own image
and spoken word and rights, in some circumstances, not to have false interviews or
statements attributed to one’s person. But we are getting ahead of ourselves, as these
are all matters meriting separate development later. What is significant for our
purposes is that the German strand of interior personality has led to a distinct
evolution of personality law, one quite different from American law.
In reference to Microcensus, the question for the Court was whether this
‘‘microcensus’’ so deeply impinged upon this sphere of intimacy as to violate article
two personality rights. Certainly ‘‘not every statistical survey of personal data
violates personal dignity … or disturbs self-determination over the innermost
(private) areas of life.’’111 Characteristic of the German regime of rights, everything
is a question of balance and proportion. No one’s right is extended to the detriment
of other rights. Thus, personality rights–even over intimate areas–are mediated in
relationship to other values of the social order. One’s obligations as ‘‘community-
connected and community-bound’’ citizens entail a certain cooperation with
officials in matters that call for state-planning, like a census.112
This inquiry necessitates a closer evaluation of the case. Survey questions
principally threaten self-determination rights when they impinge upon the ‘‘personal
intimate area of life, which by nature is confidential.’’ For ‘‘the modern industrial
state, this is a barricade to prevent administrative-technical depersonalization.’’113
However, statistical surveys inquiring only over human behavior will not generally
violate the intimate realm. This is especially so when anonymity is used, as in the
Microcensus survey, since this obscures any personal connection, thereby hindering,
if not preventing, any catalogue of human personality.114
In Microcensus, the key issue turned on inquiry into vacation and recreational
habits. While such inquiries implicate the private sphere, they do not ‘‘force
disclosure of information arising from one’s intimate sphere, nor allow the state
access to relationships that are ordinarily beyond outside scrutiny or of a
confidential nature.’’115 This type of information could be obtained from general
sources, ‘‘although with greater difficulty.’’116 Thus, the inquiry did not constitute a
111 27 BVerfGE at 7.
112 27 BVerfGE at 7.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid. Moreover, as additional precautions, the statute prohibits publication of information gathered
and binds census takers to confidentiality.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
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constitutional violation. Likewise, resort to the Rechtsstaat principle did not yield
relief, since the legal norms at issue were sufficiently definite and the measures
taken satisfied the Proportionality Principle, being suitable means to accomplish
legitimate ends.117 Microcensus thereby illustrates the same methodology used by
the Court in the outer-directed freedom of action cases: evaluation of the intensity of
the rights violation, and then testing of the case against Rechtsstaat principles,
especially that of proportionality.
Criminal Diary Case
Determining to construct a sphere of inviolable privacy is one thing. Defining exactly
what it is is another. The best more recent attempt to come to grips with these
existential questions is the Criminal Diary Case, where the Court grappled with the
question as to whether the state could use diaries of a young man accused of murder as
proof in its case.118 The man had a life-long problem in forming relationships with
women, which he was in therapy to help deal with. The therapist recommended that
he write down his inner struggle in a diary. The diaries revealed his innermost feelings
and insecurities over his inability to form relationships with women. During a search
of the home of his parents, where he lived, the police discovered the diary. The diary
entries bore certain similarities to the murder the man later became accused of.
Because of their relationship to the crime, the state sought to use them as
circumstantial proof in its case.119 The essence of the legal dispute was whether the
diary entries were portals into the innermost feelings of the defendant and, therefore,
protectable as part of the intimate realm of article two personality. In fact, the Federal
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof or BGH) believed just this–that the intimate
nature of the diaries made them part of the defendant’s protected personality rights,
but that their use in a criminal trial was justified by the important public interest in
solving a serious crime.120 Criminal Diary thus provided the Constitutional Court
with a good opportunity to bring some clarity to the personal sphere.
‘‘The general personality rights anchored in articles one and two guarantee …
control over… personal details of one’s life,’’ the Court announced, referring to the
fundamental right of informational self-determination established in Microcensus
and secured in the Census Act Case.121 But even here, the ‘‘protection is not
absolute,’’ but can be limited by ‘‘overriding public interest.’’122 This follows from
individuals’ obligations to the community and its members.123
117 Ibid.
118 80 BVerfGE 367 (1980).
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid. In this respect, the BGH upheld the decision of the lower court.
121 80 BVerfGE at 373. See Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1, 41 (1984).
122 80 BVerfGE at 373.
123 This reflects the German vision of woman as socially-connected and bound. ‘‘Limitation of freedom
can occur when justified by overriding public interest, because individuals enter into communication with
others in the social community, and their conduct effects others and can disturb the personal sphere of
others or the interests of the community.’’ Ibid.
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Nevertheless, ‘‘even overriding public interest’’ might not justify intrusion into
this most intimate sphere.124 On account of the human dignity anchor, the Court
postulated a certain ultimate core of personality from which all official entry is
barred.125 Here it was unnecessary to perform any proportional means/end testing.
Certainly only truly innermost matters would enjoy such protection.
To the extent a personal matter is not characterized as being of the innermost
‘‘inviolable area,’’ it might be counted as part of the personal sphere into which
‘‘significant public interests’’ might be allowed entry.126 Thus, much depended on
how personal matters, like the diary entries, were to be characterized.
The topic of an innermost personal sphere, and how to define it, has been
a focus of much controversy.127 Early on the Court set forth the Sphere Theory
(Spha¨rentheorie), under which human personality interests were calibrated accord-
ing to the intensity of their intimacy. Different levels of constitutional protection
were assigned the interests according to this scheme. For example, the most intimate
sphere (Intimspha¨re) was the ‘‘last, inviolable area of human freedom … from
which all public power was disseized.’’128 Aspects of sexual determination, such as
one’s sex,129 sex education130 or the marriage bedroom,131 are examples of interests
held to be within this most intimate sphere. Next in concentric order was a private or
confidential sphere (Privat or Geheimspha¨re) that was subject to the textual
limitations of article two(1).132 In this sphere, personality rights could be curtailed
only under hard proof of their necessity under the Proportionality Principle.
Vacation and recreational habits133 were examples of interests grouped in this
sphere. The last sphere was an outer or social sphere (Sozialspha¨re), which
comprised interests connected closely to society which had little intimate character.
Actions could be taken to curtail exercise of interests under less exacting standards
of proof. Examples of these interests were information leading to the solution of a
crime or disease, such as an epidemic.134
Not surprisingly, serious definitional problems arose as to the boundaries of these
spheres, and the grouping of interests within them. The spheres could not be
adequately distinguished, and people classified interests differently, leading to a
124 Ibid. This follows from Article 19(2) GG, which protects the essence of a right. As the essence of the
right of personality, the Court has postulated a certain inviolable core of personality, as discussed here.
Ibid.
125 Ibid. ‘‘The Court has recognized a last inviolable area of private life formation from which all public
power is disseized.’’ Ibid.
126 Whether this is so or not would depend on means/end testing pursuant to the Proportionality
Principle.
127 See Pieroth and Schlink (1994); Degenhart (1992).
128 Ibid. citing 38 BVerfGE 312, 320; Elfes, 6 BVerfGE at 41.
129 Transsexual Case, 49 BVerfGE 286 (1978).
130 Sex Education Case, 47 BVerfGE 46, 71 (1977).
131 27 BVerfGE 344 (1970).
132 Pieroth and Schlink (1994).
133 Microcensus, 27 BVerfGE at 1.
134 See, e.g., Criminal Diary Case, 80 BVerfGE at 375–77; Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202, 220 (1973) (noting
strong state interest in solving crime); See von Mangoldt et al. (1985).
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certain relativism of the theory.135 Moreover, the main criterion used by the
Constitutional Court–social Connectedness—proved unworkable as a legal standard
since legal regulation always involved a considerable social element, whether in
conduct, action or communication.136
For these reasons, the Court abandoned the Sphere Theory in the Census Act
Case.137 Since that abandonment, however, no satisfactory replacement theory has
been forthcoming.138 In fact, the Sphere Theory continues to provide a certain
structure to this inquiry, even if as a background concept, as is evident in the Court’s
discussion in Criminal Diary. This is especially pronounced in matters involving an
aspect of retreat from the world, such as, for example, the act of writing diaries in
Criminal Diary. The Court’s ventures may ultimately prove to be an example of the
limits of Grand Theory, not unlike similar quests in service of the first amendment.139
This brings us back to the Criminal Diary Case, which marks the last great attempt of
the Court to define an innermost sphere.140 ‘‘Whether a matter is to be characterized as
within the core area… depends on whether it is of a highly personal nature and the degree
and intensity with which it affects the interests of others or the community.’’141 If this
works fine. But the standard seems no more self-defining than the old Sphere Theory.
Indeed, it seems to call for an ad hoc weighing of personality versus social interests, thus
repeating the relativism of the former theory. Because of these difficulties, the Court has
renounced Grand Theory, at least for now, preferring to work out what is ‘‘personal’’ or
‘‘intimate’’ on a case-by-case basis.142 Thus, from the standpoint of today, the extent of the
inviolable sphere can only be determined by its delineation in case law.
Applying these principles proved no more satisfactory than defining them. The
Court split 4-4 on whether the diaries were part of an innermost personal sphere.143
The quartet of Justices believing the diary entries were not private enough focused
on their social connection. Because the diaries helped explain a gruesome crime,
they reasoned, they bore a clear connection to societal interests and did not partake
of any intimate thought, since they were written, and thus discoverable, and since
the acts were already performed.144 Moreover, use of the diaries as proof in a
serious crime provided a ‘‘significant public justification.’’145
135 Degenhart (1992); Pieroth and Schlink (1994).
136 Ibid.
137 65 BVerfGE at 45.
138 Letter of Professor Dr. Bodo Pieroth to Edward J. Eberle (November 13, 1996).
139 Eberle (1992).
140 Letter of Professor Dr. Bodo Pieroth to Edward J. Eberle (November 13, 1996).
141 80 BVerfGE at 374. This marks a renunciation of focusing solely on ‘‘social connectedness’’ as the
distinguishing factor. ‘‘The ordering of matters within the inviolable area… or the area of private life…
can no longer depend on the social significance or connection of the matter.’’ Ibid.
142 ‘‘What type and how intense a matter is … cannot be described abstractly, but can be satisfactorily
determined only upon a full consideration of all relevant factors in a particular case.’’Ibid.
143 Under German law, a tie vote results in the lower court ruling remaining in effect. See Federal
Constitutional Court Law (BVerfGG) Sect. 15(3).
144 80 BVerfGE at 376–77. The Court did not find any general protection for diaries. Therefore, much
depended on the contents of the diaries, and how one valued it.
145 Ibid.
222 E. J. Eberle
123
The four dissenting Justices, by contrast, believed the diaries to be ‘‘highly
personal,’’ reflective of the defendant’s ‘‘real personality structure … a dialogue
with the real I.’’146 Indeed, it is hard to imagine many acts more intimate than
recording one’s innermost thoughts in a diary, especially when done in the belief of
confidentiality, particularly that of the doctor-patient relationship. Thus, for these
Justices, the diaries should be protected as within the personal sphere. Moreover,
they argued, the crime was removed 17 and 8 months, respectively, from the two
diary entries most at issue.147 Thus, any connection to the real world was remote.
There is certainly an unsatisfactory quality to the Court’s analysis. Reliance on
the ad hoc balancing test may be too unprincipled, allowing each judge to see
personality or community interests as he or she wishes. There would seem to be
particular pressure to act on community interests, such as crime, to the detriment of
minority interests. Certainly the haphazardness of this case-by-case approach is a
danger to legal security. It will take some time before organizing principles are
evident around which the law may be structured. In the interim, however, there will
be great uncertainty. Because lower courts or other decision makers will not be sure
which standards to apply, this carries a risk of curtailing freedoms.
Informational Self-Determination
The most notable manifestation of the concern, expressed by the Court in
Microcensus, of preserving an intimate realm to life is the concept of informational
self-determination. This means, fundamentally, a right to control access to and
dissemination of personal data, including protection against revelation of one’s
private affairs. It is rooted in a desire to preserve the integrity of human personality
against the onslaught of the technological age and of prying eyes. Thus, the Court
has sought to carve out an area of inviolable human interiority as a secure haven. In
a sense, this represents adjustment of the Kantian ideal of moral autonomy to the
conditions of the modern age.
Building on Microcensus, the Census Act Case148 strives to preserve the
inviolability of human personality amidst revolutionary changes in the computer
age. The controversy concerned the Federal Census Act of 1983, which required the
collection of comprehensive data concerning the Federal Republic’s demographic
and social structure. The Act set the parameters for the country’s population count
and also required rudimentary personal information, such as name, address, gender,
marital status, nature of household occupants, religious affiliation, job occupation
and work setting.149 The Act also required citizens to fill out detailed questions
concerning their sources of income, educational background, mode of transportation
to and from work, use of dwelling, including method of heating and utilities.150 The
146 Ibid. Accordingly, these Justices believed that the diaries should be ‘‘absolutely protected as within
the area of private life-formation.’’
147 Ibid.
148 65 BVerfGE 1 (1984).
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
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Act further allowed information obtained to be transmitted to local government,
which could then use the information for purposes of planning, environmental
protection and redistricting. Local government could even compare information to
housing registers and, if necessary, correct them.151
Over 100 persons filed suit against the Act, complaining that the Act’s intrusive-
ness threatened their privacy rights.152 The Court agreed, at least temporarily, and
suspended the census until its constitutionality could be determined. The case is one
of the few times when individuals may directly pursue claims to the Constitutional
Court without having to exhaust legal remedies because of an immediate threat to a
fundamental right.
At the heart of Microcensus and Census Act is the concern that intrusive and
comprehensive surveys of the population will yield personality profiles which, with
the aid of modern computing techniques, will facilitate the state’s ability to access
such information at will and use it as seen fit. From the Kantian perspective, this
carries the danger of converting human beings into mere objects of statistical
survey, depersonalizing the human element. From the standpoint of human
autonomy, the Court feared that gathering, storing and using personal information
would threaten human liberty. The more that is known about a person, the easier the
person is to control.153 These concerns are especially heightened with the advance
of modern computing technology and its capacity to access human habit and
capabilities, which the Constitutional Court made a point of noting.154 The amount
of personal information stored in and accessible by computers is staggering,
including information over credit history, taxes, social security and travel plans.155
The background of German personality law provides the theoretical base for
these concerns. Since the ‘‘focus of the constitutional order … is the value and
dignity of the person, who operates in free self-determination as a member of a free
society,’’ these values must be sustained ‘‘in view of modern developments and their
accompanying threats to human personality.’’156 Human dignity must be adapted
amidst changing economic and social conditions if human personhood is to remain
inviolate in modern society. In this way, the Constitutional Court acknowledges that
changing social conditions require adaptation in the application of core concepts.
Just this motivation led the Constitutional Court to announce a general right of
informational self-determination. By informational self-determination is meant ‘‘the




154 Since the 1969 decision of Microcensus, the Court observed, the advance of computer technology and
capability has changed radically. Before, information was entered manually by key-punch and stored in
separate areas, accessible mainly by expert personnel, making it more difficult to fashion together and
obtain a personality ‘‘portrait.’’ Today, information is entered and retrievable electronically by almost
anyone, which facilitates instantaneous access to far-ranging information. 65 BVerfGE at 4, 17, 42.
155 Schwartz (1989).
156 65 BVerfGE at 41.
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what limits personal data may be disclosed.’’157 ‘‘(T)his decisional authority
requires a special measure of protection under present and future conditions of
automatic data processing.’’158 For example, ‘‘the technological capability of storing
(highly) personalized information concerning specific people is practically unlim-
ited and retrievable in seconds … without concern for distance.’’ ‘‘(T)his infor-
mation, when connected to other data sources … can produce a complete or partial
personality profile, which the affected individual cannot control or confirm its
truth.’’159 ‘‘The possibilities of acquiring information and exerting influence have
increased to a degree never previously known.’’160
This rise in technological capability poses severe threats to human personality and
human autonomy. ‘‘An individual’s right to plan and make decisions freely may be
severely curtailed, if she does not know or cannot predict adequately what personal
data is known or may be disclosed.’’161 It is unhealthy for society ‘‘where citizens do
not know who knows what about them, and when they know it.’’162 Not knowing
others’ knowledge of your affairs may lead citizens to curtail their activities or
‘‘refrain from exercising rights… like associational rights,’’ or expression, religious
or occupational freedoms. Certainly official possession of detailed personal
information carries a serious threat of abuse, including coercion and manipulation
of human autonomy.163 ‘‘This would damage an individual’s personal development,
and also the common good, because self-determination is an elementary condition of a
free democratic society based on citizens’ ability to act and to participate.’’164
Accordingly, data use that has the potential to influence people must be strictly
controlled. Against these dangers, ‘‘an individual must be protected against unlimited
collection, storage, use and transmission of personal data… as a consequence of the
free development of personality under modern conditions of data processing.’’165 In
essence, informational self-determination follows from human autonomy; in the
modern information age, control of information is power. Thus, control over personal
information is the power to control a measure of one’s fate. This is indispensable to the
free unfolding of personality.
The right to informational self-determination, like all basic rights, is not absolute in
the carefully calibrated value order of the Basic Law.166 Since persons ‘‘develop
within the social community … personal information is also a reflection of social
157 Ibid. As the Court noted, the concept of informational self-determination emanated from earlier cases
too, such as Lebach, 44 BVerfGE 353, 372 (1973); Divorce Records, 32 BVerfGE 373, 379 (1972); and
Microcensus, 27 BVerfGE at 350. 65 BVerfGE at 42.
158 65 BVerfGE at 42.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid. Such use could induce psychological pressure to conform, out of fear of how others might
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reality.’’167 Thus, there is a social dimension to personal data too, posing a tension
between personal and social components to information. Government and other actors
in society, such as banks or companies, need information about people to plan and
serve the public weal. Democracy itself depends on the free flow of information.168
‘‘The Basic Law … has resolved the tension between individuality and society by
constituting individuals as community-bound and community-related.’’169 Therefore,
‘‘individuals must … accept limitations on their right to informational self-
determination for reasons of overriding public interest (u¨berwiegenden Allgemein-
interresse).170 Just what an ‘‘overriding public interest’’ is can only be determined by
resort to standard German norms. First, the law must have a (constitutional) legal
basis, which makes clear the conditions and reach of the limitations on freedom and
thereby satisfies the Rechtsstaat command that norms be clearly stated.171 Second, the
law must satisfy the Proportionality Principle, which, as we know, mandates that
freedom be limited only to the degree necessary to satisfy public interests. Because
‘‘of the dangers of automatic data processing… the legislature must, more than ever,
adopt organization and procedural safeguards to diminish violations of individual
personal rights.’’172 Only then can one test the strength of the public interest.
Testing the Act against these principles entailed a detailed and comprehensive
analysis. First, the Court evaluated whether the information was actually
necessary.173 This involved testing legislative ends. The Court concluded that it
was legitimate to perform a census for social and economic planning.174 However,
collection and storage of data for other purposes would be constitutionally suspect.
The Court ‘‘carefully scrutinized the nature of the information collected, the
methods of its storage and transmission, and its particular uses’’ in order to assure
that the stated uses properly fell within police powers and did not pose undue threat
to human liberty.175 Protection of information thus depended on a distinction
‘‘between personality-related information that is gathered and processed in an
individually non-anonymous manner and data that is census-related.’’176 Protective
measures must be in place to assure that personality profiles of individuals cannot be
obtained. Cloaking information in anonymity is the key safeguard. Persons are not
to be treated as ‘‘mere information-objects;’’ individuals are not to be deperson-
alized as information sources without losing their essence as ‘‘spiritual-moral’’
persons.177 Other safeguards included confidentiality obligations and a prohibition
167 Ibid.
168 Schwartz (1989).






175 Kommers (1989). While it was necessary for state purposes to collect information, the Court
stipulated that data may be collected only when ‘‘suitable as well as necessary.’’ 65 BVerfGE at 46.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
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of employing census takers in locales where they lived.178 The Court ultimately
sustained most of the Act, although it invalidated several provisions, including one
that allowed local officials to ‘‘compare census data with local housing registries’’
on the ground that combining these statistics might allow officials to identify
particular persons, thereby violating the core of personality.179
In the wake of Census Act, it is worth observing what a remarkable act of judicial
activism the case represents.180 First, the Court suspended the Act until its
constitutionality could be determined, ultimately requiring the German Bundestag
(Parliament) to amend certain provisions before the census could be carried out.
This delayed the census for 4 years at notable cost.181 Second, the Court established
concretely a right of informational self-determination from the textual authority of
articles one and two. That language, of course, does not self-evidently bestow
citizens’ control over personal data. Rather, the Court extended the principle
animating the provisions to carve out this radiation of autonomy. At the root of the
Constitutional Court’s decision was the vision that human dignity and autonomy
must be preserved against the onslaught of the modern computer age. Thus,
measures need be taken to assure that the collection, storage and use of personal
data is justifiable pursuant to the Rechtsstaat, and that this power not be abused.
Reputational Interest
A more innovative aspect of informational self-determination is the right it endows
individuals to control the portrayal of facts and details of their life, even if
uncomfortable or embarrassing. This right empowers persons to shield hurtful truths
from public scrutiny in order to safeguard reputation or other personality interests.
The right also encompasses protection of personal honor as an outgrowth of
personality.182 As such, these rights can be extended to eclipse other basic rights,
including, most notably, article five expression guarantees.
Mephisto
Protection of honor and reputation in Germany is itself a highly valued
manifestation of human dignity. No case represents this view better than the
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 Since Census Act, government and courts have generally striven to meet the challenges of the case
and conform the law to constitutional standards. The German judiciary has invalidated laws that do not
adequately spell out projected uses of data or grant citizens satisfactory inspection rights. Schwartz
(1989).
181 Kommers (1989). After Census Act, the government decided to abandon the census. Instead, the
Bundestag drafted a new census bill, which the Constitutional Court approved. See, e.g., BVerfGE, NJW
707 (1989); BVerfGE, NJW 2805 (1987).
182 There is a long history, going back to the early twentieth century, of civil court protection, through
interpretation of the Civil Code, of such privacy rights. Thus, as noted previously, the Constitutional
Court has ‘‘constitutionalized’’ most of these developments of the civil court. See Krause (1965).
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famous Mephisto case, a seminal case of artistic freedom, where the Court split 3-3
in upholding an injunction against publication of Klaus Mann’s novel of the same
name on the ground that it defamed the memory of a famous deceased actor who
had been quite active in the theater during the Nazi time.183
All basic rights, including artistic rights, must be interpreted within the value
order of the Basic Law, according to the Court. Since the Basic Law is founded on
the view ‘‘of the human person as an autonomous being developing freely within the
social community,’’184 artistic freedom must be measured against article one human
dignity, the supreme value. To the extent artistic or communication freedoms
conflict with human dignity, they may have to yield, depending on the concrete
balancing of the freedoms at issue. For example, in Mephisto, it might be argued
that the tangible effect of Mann’s novel was to tarnish the memory of the deceased
actor. Disparagement of the dead could be thought to be inconsistent with human
dignity.185 ‘‘[A]n artist’s use of personal data about people in his environment can
affect their social rights to respect and esteem.’’186 To that extent, communication
freedoms may have to yield to the superior value of dignity, as manifested in this
interest in honor and reputation. In this manner, the Court implied limits on the
seemingly boundless guarantee of artistic freedom, as it previously had implied
limits to the seeming express limitation of personality rights in Elfes. In both cases,
the Court acted on behalf of its vision of human dignity; in Mephisto this acted to
limit expression rights, in Elfes it limited restriction of freedom of action. Human
dignity thus becomes the glue between both rights-enhancing and rights-constricting
interpretations. Certainly this illustrates the Constitutional Court’s creative inter-
pretation, as the Supreme Court too has sometimes displayed.187
Anchoring reputational rights in the malleable concepts of human dignity, and
accompanying personality, allowed the Constitutional Court, in essence, to imply a
constitutional right to be free from defamation. This could be justified from the
‘‘objective’’ theory of constitutionalism, requiring the state, as it does, to realize the
norms of the value order.188
183 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971). The central character of the novel was an actor named Hendrik Ho¨fgen,
whom Klaus Mann, the son of the great German writer Thomas Mann, portrayed as having made his
name by playing the devil in Goethe’s Faust during the Nazi period. While other artists were prosecuted,
Ho¨fgen ‘‘betrayed his own political convictions and cast off all ethical and humanitarian restraints to
further his career by making a pact with… (those in) power in Nazi Germany.’’ Ibid. The story was based
on a real life actor, Gustaf Gru¨ndgens, whose career paralled the fictitious Ho¨fgen in important respects.
The suit was brought by Gru¨ndgens’ son to protect the honor and dignity of the dead, illustrating the
extraordinary protection afforded honor in Germany.
184 30 BVerfGE at 193, translated in Kommers (1989).
185 30 BVerfGE at 194. For discussion of rights of personality extending after death, See Hubmann
(1967).
186 Ibid.
187 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (deriving right of privacy from penumbras
that emanate from specific rights).
188 Eberle (1999).
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Observations
Having evaluated human dignity and personality in German constitutional law,
Germany accords broad freedom to individuals to shape their destiny, while balancing
individual aspiration against the demands of maintaining social order. The Consti-
tutional Court acts in an activist capacity to shape these freedoms against the clutches
of majoritarian control. The German vision, set out with reasonable clarity, reflecting
the systematization of German legal science, centers around the human person as a
‘‘spiritual-moral’’ individual, and her dignity, including especially her ability to
realize human capacity and satisfaction. Human values are thus the focal point of the
legal order.
The German value order, grounded in the underlying philosophic thought of
Kant, reflects a careful calibration of rights and responsibilities, interpreted by the
Constitutional Court as an ‘‘objective value-order,’’ one that must apply generally in
society, effecting all legal relationships. Since human dignity is the apex of this
value structure, it naturally radiates throughout the legal system, in public and
private law. An essential part of human dignity is basic rights, and corresponding
obligations.
While basic rights are mainly defensive or subjective in function, connoting a
personal sphere of liberty, only rarely is such subjective liberty a matter of complete
discretion. Instead, personal liberty is subject to limitation by the constitutional
order, textually secured through express reservation or by necessary implication.189
In this sense, rights are limited by obligations to others, as made manifest through
the law. Yet, limitations of liberty are themselves not a matter of parliamentarian
discretion or social control. Rather, liberty may be restrained only upon justification
pursuant to the value order.190 In this sense, dignitarian morality acts as the ‘‘higher
law’’ of German constitutionalism.191
German concepts are reasonably well thought out, constituting an integrated
whole, reflecting again the classification and comprehensiveness of German legal
science. There is an inner dimension, focusing on the ‘‘moral-spiritual’’ essence of
man, and there is an outer dimension, reflecting women’s activity in the world. Both
dimensions, of course, radiate from the same source of human dignity.
German personality law reflects the broad themes of German law: human dignity
and its cognates, including valuation of life as an end in itself, worth and equal
worth, and freedom to act within the constraints of the value order. Foremost among
these is the focus on the interior component of human personality, an emanation of
the inner striving for freedom. Through its jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court
has attempted to capture, and preserve, the essence of human personhood and
personality, and safeguard it amidst the challenges of modern society. Hence, the
Constitutional Court seeks to identify, and fortify, an Inner Space, ‘‘in which to
189 See, e.g., Articles 2 and 5 GG.
190 In all cases, the essence of the right must be preserved. Article 19(2) GG.
191 By higher law I mean all actions must be judged for conformity with dignity, as the dispositive norm
of the Basic Law’s value order. Note, for example, the contrasting effect of human dignity in Elfes and
Mephisto.
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develop freely and self-responsibly … personalities … (into) which (people) can
retreat, barring all entrance to the outer world, in which one can enjoy tranquility
and a right to solitude.’’192 The Census Cases, by limiting official use of personal
information on account of human autonomy, show how such nurturing of human
personhood can make a difference with respect to modern social and economic
developments.193
While the Census Cases are the most dramatic illustrations of this strand of
interiority, the Constitutional Court has carved out related emanations of human
personality, in limitation of political and social forces, in service of the inner person.
Most notable here is the right to control personal information, crystallized into a
general right of informational self-determination. Intimate information reflects
human personality, according to the Court, being an ingredient to conception of
personhood, from inside and outside perspectives. Accordingly, the person
participating in this aspect of ‘‘life-formation’’ should have a measure of control
over these matters. Based on this reasoning, the Court has extended degrees of
protection over personal data,194 honor and rights to one’s good name.195
The German vision reflects careful ordering of the characteristics of human
personhood, especially those called upon in social intercourse, to facilitate well-
being. Freedom to develop human capacity is sought, indeed encouraged, to the
maximum extent compatible with the freedom of everybody else. Thus, moral
obligation and respect for others requires that freedom be exercised within the
bounds of community. In this view, freedom can truly exist only with provision for
well-being, mutual toleration and respect. It is in this sense that the ‘‘human person
is an autonomous being developing freely within the social community.’’196 She is
not ‘‘isolated and self-regarding,’’ but ‘‘related to and bound by the community.’’197
Thus, individual self-determination is offset by responsibility, civility and
participation.
Viewed in this light, the German vision of constitutional democracy serves as an
alternative strategy to organize society, one reflecting the benefits, perhaps, of added
perspective and experience. There are obvious indigenous influences that led to the
erection, and make-up, of the German value-order, especially to empower and guide
personal decision-making. Kantian philosophy and nineteenth century German legal
science are decisive theoretical influences. The German experience with anarchy
during the Weimar Republic and of dehumanization during the Nazi period,
including severe limitation of human personality and capacity and, even,
annihilation of life itself, are crucial histories. The erection of the German value-
order may, in fact, reflect a desire to channel human behavior out of fear of the evil
that might arise (again) from unchained human passion.
192 Microcensus, 27 BVerfGE at 6.
193 Lebach, and its concern for rehabilitation of a felow evidences this too.
194 See, e.g., Census Act, 65 BVerfGE 1 (1984).
195 Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971).
196 Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE at 193.
197 Life Imprisonment Case, 45 BVerfGE 187, 227 (1977).
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The Constitutional Court is aggressively activist. The Constitutional Court
actively sets out to realize in society the values of the Basic Law, attempting to
coordinate constitutional text with social reality. The wholesale rewrite of
legislation in the Census Cases attests to this. The Constitutional Court thus acts
somewhat more like the US Supreme Court did in the first third of this century under
the substantive due process regime, censoring governmental actions, where
necessary, for reasonableness. In this way, the Basic Law, as interpreted by the
Constitutional Court, acts like a blueprint for society, whereas the American
Constitution is more like an outline of government. The German Court places a
premium on the text of the Basic Law, its structure and purpose, and its applicability
to current social and economic conditions. The Constitutional Court openly makes
use of background principles, not always clearly set out in constitutional text, such
as the rule of law, the Social State Principle and, of course, the capacious concept of
‘‘human dignity.’’ The Constitutional Court actively attempts to maintain the
essence of constitutional concepts while keeping constitutional text ‘‘in tune with
the times.’’198 Recall, for example, the Constitutional Court’s attempts to preserve
the principle of human dignity amidst a changing world in the Census Cases, in
relation to changing computer technology. In these ways, the Constitutional Court is
forward in focus, whereas the Supreme Court looks backward.
From these differences in constitutional vision, technique and doctrine, we can
extrapolate deeper differences in legal culture. The German prioritization of human
dignity raises moral autonomy to the forefront of society; it is the higher law of
German constitutionalism. Thus, persons have expansive freedom to act and to
develop human ability, but that freedom is coupled with a concern for wellbeing,
including solidifying the inner realm of personality. Moral autonomy, moreover, is
not a one-way street; it involves responsibility too, including to others which one
must recognize, even if through enforcement of the moral order. Accordingly,
freedom is to unfold within the social community, which can both empower and
limit human activity, depending on resolution of the conflict between individual
and social claims.199 Rights are thus exercised within a framework of duties and
responsibilities, mediated ultimately by the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of
this higher law.
Through examination of these contrasting constitutional visions, we discover
alternative conceptions of humanity, personality and community, as outlined in
public law, conceptions that can be enriching, ennobling or both. Perhaps this is the
central purpose of comparative law: we learn, by looking at others, important truths
about ourselves, truths which can then be re-evaluated or reaffirmed. Certainly there
is much to learn about the two laws, much the two laws can learn from each other.
For example, the Census Cases demonstrate a sensible way to preserve the
inviolability of personhood, and human freedom, amidst dramatic technological
change. In addition, if Americans want to pursue a more coherent vision of
community, the German method of coupling rights with duties, individually and
198 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
199 Compare, for example, Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971) with Transsexuality, 49. BVerfGE 286
(1978).
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socially, points the way toward introducing communal values into the social order.
Through attempting to secure human dignity for all, we would perhaps be less
preoccupied in securing our own claims. In this way, we might escape our
obscession with ‘‘rights-talk’’ and learn to appreciate the value of human solidarity.
Conversely, if dignitarian rights are justifiably viewed as indispensable to
German law, then the Constitutional Court might profitably transplant certain of the
techniques employed by the US Supreme Court to preserve fundamental rights. For
example, importation of strict scrutiny analysis would lend a degree of clarity and
precision to German rights analysis. To a degree, this already has occurred,200
evidencing the transplantation of concepts across cultures, albeit with some
adjustment. Perhaps pursuit of a mutual cultural influence is not so far off after all.
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